As Xi Jinping last week rolled out the red carpet in Beijing for over 50 of Africa’s leaders, along with the UN’s Antonio Guterres, at the ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), one could only reflect on the recent comment by Singapore’s Kishore Mahbubani: “the coming decades may belong to the Global South.”
Given its unappealing acronym, FOCAC, many may be forgiven for being unaware of this three-day “grand reunion of the China-Africa big family.” (Tiny eSwatini, population 1.2 million out of Africa’s 1.2 billion, remains the lone outlier, having stubbornly maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan since 1968.)
After all, FOCAC only convenes every three years – and the last reunion, hosted by Senegal, was a virtual affair due to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, ignoring FOCAC’s significance would be a mistake – as with other initiatives like BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, all of which signify the growing power and confidence among countries once dismissed as poor and peripheral.
Such groupings, largely driven by Beijing, have solidified the previously vague concept of the Global South. They reflect the rapid shift in the global balance of economic and diplomatic power. More importantly, they highlight the ongoing failure of the post-World War II powers, clustered around the Group of 7, to move beyond what many in the Global South perceive as a condescending, neo-colonial relationship with the Third World.
For decades, most Western leaders have kept Africa on the distant periphery of their foreign policy concerns. Despite its vast size and abundant natural resources, Africa still accounts for a mere 2.7 per cent of global GDP. Worse, the continent is home to many of the world’s poorest and most troubled countries, including a “coup belt” of seven nations that have experienced a wave of coups in recent years.
In contrast to the Western approach, Beijing has maintained a consistent presence in Africa for over five decades. Even back in 1982, while I was living in Beijing, it was hard to keep track of the steady stream of African leaders being hosted for grand dinners in the Great Hall of the People. This long-standing consistency has earned China significant soft power, not only in Africa but also in the United Nations. As a committed member of the Global South, China is increasingly positioning itself as a driving force behind the global economic rebalancing.
As Paul Melly of Chatham House in London noted over the weekend, “For African governments resentful of the pressure to take sides in international disputes, China now appears as a refreshingly reliable partner, willing to collaborate without discrimination with both Moscow’s allies and with civilian-ruled states closer to Europe and the US.”
Melly points out that despite the coup in Niger last July, Beijing continues its work on a 2,000km oil pipeline between Niger and Benin. Similarly, in Guinea, China remains committed to building a 600km iron ore railway to the coast, despite a coup in 2021.
Demonstrating China’s commitment to action, Xi used the China-Africa summit to pledge a fresh US$50 billion, through credit lines and investments, to Africa over the next three years. He signalled a shift in focus beyond major infrastructure projects, prioritising green energy transitions, including investment in the local manufacture of electric vehicles.
Xi also hinted at a willingness to invest in nuclear energy – in sharp contrast to France, which has mined uranium in Niger for decades to fuel its own nuclear plants, yet has never supported the development of nuclear power in Niger or other West African nations.
This shift in investment priorities may help address another pressing issue – China’s massive trade surplus with the continent. Last year, China exported goods worth US$173 billion to Africa, while importing only US$109 billion in return.
While Xi’s promises have yet to materialise, Beijing has been Africa’s largest bilateral investor for nearly two decades and appears poised to remain so, despite occasional controversies, such as over its Ugandan oil pipeline into Tanzania or the illegal shipment of logs from Mozambique. Moreover, accusations of “debt-trap diplomacy” persist, with Zambia’s default in 2020 being a notable example.
African debt undoubtedly dominated many of the bilateral discussions held on the sidelines of FOCAC last week. Many African economies are burdened by record-high debt levels, and debt interest rates are unlikely to fall as swiftly as they would hope.
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recently reported that 24 African countries currently have public debt exceeding 60 per cent of their GDP. In 20 nations, debt servicing costs amount to more than 10 per cent of revenue. Put simply, 750 million people live in countries where governments spend more on interest payments than on health or education.
While some may view the China-Africa summit as theatrical rather than substantive, it is part of a consistent Africa strategy that spans decades. This strategy is quietly but fundamentally reshaping the balance of power on the global stage.
Written by David Dodwell is the executive director of the Hong Kong-APEC Trade Policy Study Group, a trade policy think tank. The article reflects the author’s opinions and not necessarily those of The Southern African Times.
