The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) continues to represent one of the continent’s most ambitious projects in fostering economic integration, even as the uneven pace of reforms raises questions about its long-term impact. The recent shipment of 25,000 tonnes of Namibian salt to Nigeria marked Namibia’s first official trade under AfCFTA, signalling both the symbolic and practical potential of the agreement in diversifying markets and deepening intra-African trade.
Seven years since its adoption, AfCFTA has been ratified by 48 of the African Union’s 55 member states, with 19 publishing their tariff schedules. The initiative builds on existing regional frameworks such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the East African Community (EAC), extending earlier efforts at harmonisation. Southern Africa is home to Africa’s oldest customs union, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), founded over a century ago to remove tariffs among its members. While AfCFTA aims to provide a continental alternative, the success of such an endeavour depends on translating political commitments into operational reforms.
Despite the clear intention to shield African economies from the volatility of global trade, structural constraints remain significant. Intra-African trade currently accounts for only 15–21 per cent of total African trade, far behind Asia, where regional commerce reached 60 per cent of total trade in 2025 according to the World Bank. Reliance on external markets has left African economies highly exposed to global disruptions. Episodes such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and shifts in United States trade policy demonstrate the risks of external dependence.
Infrastructure shortfalls are a central obstacle. Limited railway networks, inadequate port facilities and underinvestment in logistics make cross-border trade costly and slow. While external partners, notably China, have supported infrastructure development across Africa, such arrangements often perpetuate dependency rather than reduce it. Addressing these gaps through African-led initiatives will be critical to advancing AfCFTA’s vision.
Political will is equally essential. While tariff protocols have been ratified, many governments remain reluctant to dismantle entrenched barriers or to harmonise domestic frameworks with regional rules. For states with weaker fiscal capacity, concerns about losing tariff revenue further complicate the debate. Smaller economies, in particular, fear that larger blocs such as SACU or the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) may dominate outcomes to their disadvantage.
Nonetheless, the continental agreement remains a pivotal opportunity. A youthful and growing labour force positions Africa to benefit from industrial renewal if governments invest in manufacturing capacity, technical skills, and predictable regulatory environments. This scenario would allow Africa to negotiate trade from a position of collective strength and reduce dependence on raw material exports. Conversely, failure to integrate risks leaving the continent in a cycle of exporting unprocessed resources while importing manufactured goods, reinforcing historical asymmetries.
AfCFTA is not a panacea, but it is a strategic framework to reshape Africa’s position in global commerce. The Namibian salt shipment illustrates that incremental progress is possible, but sustained reforms, investments in infrastructure, and stronger political resolve will determine whether AfCFTA becomes a transformative platform or another unrealised aspiration. In this moment of global trade uncertainty, Africa’s capacity to build its own market mechanisms will be decisive in shaping its economic future.
