Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Namibia on 9 July 2025, his first to the country and the first by any Indian Prime Minister in over three decades, signified a deliberate recalibration in India’s Africa outreach. Arriving in Windhoek amid enthusiastic public and parliamentary reception, Prime Minister Modi’s itinerary extended well beyond ceremonial optics. It represented a profound strategic recalibration within the context of a shifting global minerals economy and growing geopolitical competition on the African continent.
The visit occurred against the backdrop of China’s assertive engagement with African resource and infrastructure landscapes. Beijing’s monopolistic control over several critical supply chains, particularly in rare earth elements and digital infrastructure, has prompted countries such as India, Japan, and the United States to seek diversified partnerships across the Global South. India’s approach, however, distinctively balances geopolitical interests with development-oriented cooperation and capacity building.
Namibia, a key player in Africa’s extractives sector, figures prominently in India’s emerging strategy. The country is the fourth-largest producer of uranium globally, accounting for approximately 11% of global output. Its untapped deposits of lithium, cobalt, copper, and rare earth elements are now viewed as vital to energy transitions and strategic technological capabilities. For India, the need to secure uninterrupted access to these minerals is imperative, particularly to meet its Paris Agreement targets and to fuel its expanding nuclear energy programme.
India’s domestic National Critical Minerals Mission (NCMM) and international initiatives such as the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Partnership frame this mineral-focused diplomacy. India’s interest in Namibia reflects a move towards mitigating supply-side vulnerabilities caused by China’s frequent export restrictions, particularly regarding rare earth elements—materials indispensable for semiconductors, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and military technologies.
During discussions in Windhoek, both governments revived stalled agreements on uranium supply and signed new memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to facilitate joint mineral exploration, technology transfer, and sustainable mining practices. These include environmental and labour provisions aligned with OECD guidelines and Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) standards. Such alignment indicates India’s intent to combine strategic access with responsible partnership—a pitch increasingly resonating with African countries seeking sovereignty over their resources.
The economic rationale is equally clear. As of 2024, India–Namibia bilateral trade stood between US $650 million and US $814 million, a significant leap from the modest US $80 million in 2008–09. However, these figures remain well below potential. India’s private sector, particularly in pharmaceuticals, energy, and diamond processing, is already a significant investor in Namibia, with cumulative investments exceeding US $800 million. Modi’s emphasis on enhancing direct diamond trade between Namibia and India could further catalyse value creation. India, the world’s largest diamond cutter and polisher, currently channels the bulk of its imports through intermediaries in Antwerp or London. Direct access would benefit both nations by eliminating third-party margins and increasing beneficiation in Namibia.
Equally significant was the announcement of India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) system expansion into Namibia. UPI, an open-source digital payment architecture developed by India’s National Payments Corporation, has already been piloted in countries such as Mauritius and the UAE. Modi’s statement—“People will be able to send money faster than they can say Tangi Unene”—encapsulated the intent: to promote financial inclusion and interoperable digital infrastructure that empowers local populations while subtly offering an alternative to Chinese-led digital ecosystems across Africa.
China has invested heavily in African digital infrastructure, with companies like Huawei and ZTE building vast networks, often accompanied by allegations of surveillance and data insecurity. In contrast, India’s open-source, government-to-government approach to digital development presents itself as less extractive and more collaborative. This aligns with India’s broader narrative of South–South cooperation, a theme Modi reiterated while paying homage to Namibia’s founding president Dr Sam Nujoma and referencing India’s early support for Namibia’s anti-colonial movement.
Namibia’s geostrategic positioning within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) further amplifies its significance. Through trade corridors like the Walvis Bay Corridor Group, India could potentially gain access to inland markets such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. The regional implications are far-reaching. South Africa and Botswana—regional leaders in the diamond and mineral sectors—have shown increasing assertiveness over beneficiation and domestic processing. Botswana’s recent renegotiation of its agreement with De Beers and South Africa’s policy shift towards resource nationalism suggest that external partners must approach with transparency and long-term commitment. India’s positioning as a responsible partner, investing not only in extraction but also in downstream infrastructure and sustainability, may offer a diplomatic advantage.
People-to-people cooperation continues to underpin bilateral goodwill. Namibia remains an active participant in India’s Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, with hundreds of professionals receiving training in defence, public administration, and agriculture. The Namibian Air Force has benefitted from Indian technical assistance since the mid-1990s, strengthening institutional linkages in military cooperation. In the cultural domain, initiatives such as academic exchanges, scholarships, and diaspora engagements have kept the relationship grounded beyond just strategic calculus.
Overall, the visit to Namibia was not an isolated bilateral event, but rather a signal of India’s maturing Africa policy—one that sees African nations not as resource providers alone, but as partners in development, innovation, and regional stability. As global competition intensifies over energy transition inputs and digital infrastructure frameworks, India’s dual-focus strategy—of mineral security and digital cooperation—positions it uniquely.
For Namibia, the benefits may include greater leverage in the global minerals trade, enhanced infrastructure, and a reliable strategic partner not tied to conditions of debt or asymmetry. For India, access to vital raw materials and regional goodwill enhances its credibility as a rising global power with a constructive presence in Africa.
If carefully institutionalised, this mineral-plus-digital diplomacy could serve as a replicable model for India’s engagement across the African continent, anchoring a new era of mutual benefit, sustainable growth, and multipolar cooperation.
