On 27 June 2025, the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed a peace agreement in Washington, mediated by the United States government under former President Donald Trump’s “transactional” diplomatic ethos. This new initiative aims to put an end to three decades of conflict and mistrust between the two Central African neighbours. However, the question remains: will this accord succeed where many before it have failed?
To assess its potential, we must unpack both the current state of conflict and the geopolitical calculus that shaped the agreement.
The roots of the current conflict are entangled in the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Thousands of génocidaires fled into eastern DRC, where they established bases that persist under groups like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Rwanda has long cited their presence as justification for its security operations and support—albeit unofficial—for the M23 rebel movement, which re-emerged in 2021 and has since seized extensive territory in North Kivu. Meanwhile, the DRC government, along with UN and independent reports, has accused Rwanda of backing M23 with troops and logistics—allegations Kigali denies despite evidence of cross-border support.
This recent agreement is not the first of its kind. From the Pretoria Accord (2002) to the Nairobi Agreements and Luanda processes, peace deals have routinely collapsed under the weight of non-compliance, exclusion of key actors, and regional mistrust. M23’s 2021 resurgence was itself a reaction to perceived failures in the March 23 (2009) agreement, which promised integration of rebels into the national army and protection for the Banyarwanda communities. Their exclusion from the current negotiations significantly weakens its enforceability.
Another weakness of this new accord is its lack of clarity on enforcement mechanisms. Historical evidence shows that accords without verifiable security and monitoring protocols tend to be ineffective. The East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which had been deployed in 2022 to contain M23, was eventually withdrawn due to political disagreements and lack of mandate. According to Mushitsi and Magabo (2024), the EACRF’s failure stemmed largely from a reluctance by regional actors to challenge Rwanda’s interests directly, coupled with the absence of a united diplomatic front. Link to full article
The exclusion of other armed groups—over 120 are currently active in the DRC—also makes the agreement vulnerable to sabotage. Swart (2012) warned that failure to create inclusive peace dialogues risks triggering rival rebellions by marginalised factions. Read more
In terms of economic incentives, Kinshasa has offered to simplify its tax regime and open mining sectors to American investors. The country sits atop vast reserves of lithium, coltan, tin, and gold—minerals critical to global tech supply chains. Yet the lack of state control in the east, and persistent corruption, deters serious investment. American firms are unlikely to commit capital until there is greater transparency and credible security. As Kabwe (2023) points out, the securitisation of mining zones has become increasingly privatised and militarised, creating further instability rather than addressing it. Source
There is also a regional angle that has gone largely unexamined in popular commentary. Historically, regional organisations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have played key roles in peacebuilding, albeit with varying effectiveness. According to Rwigema (2025), SADC’s neutrality and EAC’s geographic proximity give both blocs a strategic role in monitoring border demilitarisation and supporting disarmament programmes. However, the US-led nature of this deal raises concerns about the sidelining of these African-led mechanisms. Full paper
The US’s approach—pragmatic, interest-driven, and transactional—may also clash with the complexity of local realities. While the Trump administration’s mediation suggests a shift toward bilateralism over multilateral engagement, it remains unclear whether this approach can address long-standing ethnic tensions, land disputes, and identity politics fuelling the conflict.
Even in terms of refugee repatriation—over 80,000 Congolese have sought asylum in Rwanda—the mechanisms for safe return remain ambiguous. Without rehabilitation programmes and local reconciliation, returnees may be caught in a cycle of displacement and revenge.
The resurgence of M23 was itself driven by the marginalisation of Banyarwanda communities. According to Nzobakenga (2024), transnational ethnic alliances and shared grievances against Kinshasa’s centralisation efforts remain potent mobilising tools for insurgency.
In sum, while the peace agreement symbolises a diplomatic win, especially for US interests in the resource-rich region, it remains a symbolic gesture rather than a substantive breakthrough. Its lack of inclusivity, fragile enforcement, and geopolitical ambiguity undermine its credibility.
The potential for success will depend not merely on words signed in Washington, but on regional coherence, the buy-in of all stakeholders—particularly armed groups—and tangible shifts in governance and economic policy within the DRC.
From the Editor’s Desk
